Nazar Gul.
The following is a transcript, translated into English, of an actual chat that occurred over Yahoo on the date indicated. The original language is Pashto, and the chatters were in Afghanistan. No names have been altered, and I am told that this is the first time this conversation has been released to the public. It is, sadly, all too typical of what happens there on a daily basis. Continue reading
Handmade Afghan doll: click for larger view
If our aid efforts in Afghanistan have largely gotten us nowhere, we would do well to consider that most of them are implemented in a way that amounts to Marxism: the central authority distributes goods according to people’s needs, with the expectation that those people will produce according to their abilities. Humanity spent the twentieth century proving that such a model does not work, so it is incongruous that we would attempt it in Afghanistan. At one point during the last three years, I was given control of an aid program operating in rural Dand District, south of Kandahar City, and I was free to employ my own market-based implementation strategy. I may report that we not only sparked booming economic growth in all our target villages, but we also wrested two villages from Taliban control and formally aligned them with the Afghan government. Think about that: an aid program seized ground from the enemy without a shot fired or a life lost. If we want to win in Afghanistan, I offer this program as a blueprint.
Counterinsurgency is primarily a political operation, not a military one. The only reason the military even gets involved is because, as Mao Tse-Tung wrote, Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun. The reason insurgencies happen is because people are violently dissatisfied with their legitimate government. It is then up to the legitimate government to change in a way that redresses people’s grievances. Aid and development organizations end up playing a major role in this process. Unfortunately, the members of such organizations do not think of themselves as counterinsurgents, and they tend not to behave like people waging a war. As a result the military has extensive literature on the topic of counterinsurgency, the aid community has virtually none. This is backward. Continue reading
“(T)he kingdom of Kabul, without Kandahar, was like a head without a nose, or a fort without any gate.” –Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan, 1900 Continue reading
In an obscure corner of the Humanities, they study a place called Serindia. Serindia appears on no map, as it had no political identity. It was a region defined by a common and very unusual artistic culture. It was a fusion of two great cultures, actually, and it produced some stunningly beautiful artworks. Serindia had no definite geographical boundaries, it was just a curious borderland.
I AM THE ALAMANACH 